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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 04-3510
__________
ALFRED DIGIACOMO,
Appellant,
v.
TEAMSTERS PENSION TRUST FUND
OF PHILADELPHIA AND VICINITY,
Appellee.
__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Civil Action No. 04-1090)
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis
__________
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ALITO * and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: November 15, 2005)
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT DENYING
APPELLANT’S APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
__________
DORIS J. DABROWSKI, ESQ.
1500 Walnut Street, Suite 900
Philadelphia, PA 19102

*

Judge Alito did not participate in the conference resulting in this Opinion.

Attorney for Appellant
Alfred DiGiacomo
SUSAN A. MURRAY, ESQ.
Freedman & Lorry, P.C.
400 Market Street, Suite 900
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Attorney for Appellee
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund
of Philadelphia and Vicinity
Garth, Circuit Judge:
Alfred DiGiacomo brought this action against the Teamsters Pension Trust Fund
of Philadelphia and Vicinity (the “Fund”) pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq., alleging that the Fund
incorrectly computed his pension benefits by refusing to credit pre-ERISA service time
accrued prior to a break-in-service. The District Court granted the Fund’s motion to
dismiss on the ground that ERISA did not preclude the Fund from relying on certain
break-in-service provisions in its governing pension plan. Those provisions explicitly
permitted the Fund to exclude DiGiacomo’s pre-ERISA service time accrued prior to his
break-in-service. A divided panel of this Court reversed, holding that Section 204 of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1054, trumped the plan’s break-in-service provisions and thus
required the Fund to aggregate DiGiacomo’s pre-break and post-break service time in
calculating his accrued benefit. See DiGiacomo v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of

-2-

Philadelphia and Vicinity, 420 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2005).1
We revisit this matter only to decide whether DiGiacomo, as the prevailing party,
is entitled to attorney’s fees under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(1).2 That provision
provides that “the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs
of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(1) (emphasis added); see also Ursic v.
Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(1)
“does not automatically mandate an award to a prevailing party”) (citation omitted). We
have set forth the following five factors to guide the exercise of such discretion:
(1) the
(2) the
(3) the
(4) the
(5) the

offending parties’ culpability or bad faith;
ability of the offending parties to satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees;
deterrent effect of an award of attorneys’ fees against the offending parties;
benefit conferred on members of the pension plan as a whole; and
relative merits of the parties’ position.

Ursic, 719 F.2d at 673.
We conclude that application of the Ursic factors does not support DiGiacomo’s
request for an award of attorney’s fees. Our determination is particularly informed by the
first and fifth Ursic factors. As we noted earlier in these proceedings, the question

1

The Court denied the Fund’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc on October 5, 2005.

2

DiGiacomo’s counsel seeks $38,920.00 in attorney’s fees for services rendered in
successfully bringing an appeal from the District Court’s dismissal of the action. We requested
that the Fund respond to DiGiacomo’s application for attorney’s fees. On November 8, 2005, the
Fund filed Appellees’ Response in Opposition to Appellant’s Application for Attorney’s Fees,
arguing that DiGiacomo has failed to satisfy the guidelines set forth in Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines,
719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983) for an award of attorney’s fees.
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presented by this appeal – “whether, for accrual of benefit purposes, ERISA prevents
pension plans from denying credit for pre-ERISA service time accrued prior to a
break-in-service” – is a “close and difficult one.” DiGiacomo, 420 F.3d at 225. The
question has divided the Courts of Appeals. Compare McDonald v. Pension Plan of the
NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 320 F.3d 151, 153 (2d Cir. 2003) with Jones v. UOP, 16
F.3d 141, 143 (7th Cir.1994) and Redmond v. Burlington N. R.R. Co. Pension Plan, 821
F.2d 461, 466-67 (8th Cir. 1987). And it has led to a division within our Court. See
DiGiacomo, 420 F.3d at 228-231 (Alito, J., dissenting).
In view of this divergence of opinion regarding the proper construction of
ERISA’s break-in-service rules, it is clear to us that there was no culpability or bad faith
on the part of the Fund in partially denying DiGiacomo’s claim for accrued benefits. It is
equally clear to us that the Fund’s legal position has significant merit. Leaving aside the
supporting opinions from the federal appellate courts, the Fund prevailed before the
Arbitrator and the District Court in the proceedings below. In addition, the Fund
reasonably relied on past decisions from our Court in enforcing its pre-ERISA break-inservice provisions. See Haas & Cass v. Boeing Co., Civ. A. No. 90-7414, 1992 WL
221335, at *4-*7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1992), aff’d without opinion, 993 F.2d 877 (3d Cir.
1993); see also Tanzillo v. Local Union 617, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 769
F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1985). In these circumstances, we find no basis for a discretionary
award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.
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Even assuming, without deciding, that the remaining Ursic factors weigh in favor
of an award of attorney’s fees, we believe that the first and fifth Ursic factors so strongly
militate against such an award as to control our determination. Accordingly, we will deny
DiGiacomo’s application for attorney’s fees.
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